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NOTATION
ADAS = Army Digital Avionics System.
ADOCS = Advanced Digital Optical Control System.
AFTI = Advanced Fighter Tactical Integration.
AMAP = Army Multibus Avionics Processor.
AVRADA = U.S. Army Avionics Research and Development
Activity
BIT = Built In Test
CBIT = Continuous Built In Test
CPU = Central Processing Unit.
EMI = ElectroMagnetic Interference.
EPROM = Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory.
FLIR = Forward-Looking Infa-Red.
I/O = Input/Output.
IFR = Instrument Flight Rules.
LHX = Army family of light helicopters for the 1990s
and beyond; scout, light attack and utility.
LRU = Line Replaceable Unit.
LSI = Large Scale Integration.
MBIT = Maintenance Built In Test
MTBF = Mean Time Between Failures.
NOE = Nap Of Earth.
PBIT = Pre-flight Built In Test
PROM = Programmable Read Only Memory.
RAM = Random Access Memory.
RAMPS = Redundant Asynchronous Microprocessor System.
REBUS = REsident BackUp Software.
SANDAC IV = A compact, modular microprocessor (68000) card family
developed by Sandia National Laboratories.
STAR = (Army) System Test bed for Avionics Research
VHSIC = Very High Speed Integrated Circuits.
VLSI = Very Large Scale Integration.
1553B = A military standard number corresponding to a
serial data bus.
68000 = Model number of a Motorola 16-bit microprocessor.
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REPORT SUMMARY
This report presents an advanced, fault tolerant multiprocessor
avionics architecture as could be employed in an advanced rotorcraft
such as LHX.
The processor structure is designed to interface with existing
digital avionics systems and concepts including the Army Digital
Avionics System (ADAS) cockpit/display system, navaid and
communications suites, integrated sensing suite, and the Advanced
Digital Optical Control System (ADOCS).
The report defines mission, maintenance and safety-of-flight
reliability goals as might be expected for an operational LHX
aircraft. Based on use of a modular, compact (16-bit) microprocessor
card family, results of an preliminary study examining simplex, dual
and standby-sparing architectures is presented.
Given the stated constraints, it is shown that the dual architecture
is best suited to meet reliability goals with minimum hardware and
software overhead.
The report presents hardware and software design considerations for
realizing the architecture including redundancy management
requirements and techniques as well as verification and validation
needs and methods.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION: REPORT OUTLINE AND OBJECTIVE
This report was prepared for, the U.S. Army Avionics Research and
Development Activity (AVRADA) which, during the report period is
investigating an advanced computer architecture known as AMAP (Army
Multibus Avionics Processor.)
The Army's AMAP development was intended to explore two concepts:
(1) the application of multiprocessing to avionics real-time
data processing.
(2) Use of a compact, modular packaging scheme developed by
Sandia National Laboratories called SANDAC IV.
The development of real time multiprocessing techniques is
extremely important: near-future operational systems (such as LHX)
pose a quantum jump in data processing requirements that will
outstrip single-CPU capability. Concurrent application of the SANDAC
IV packaging is intended to keep the expanded equipment requirement
forced by multiprocessing into manageable equipment volumes and LRU
counts.
This report develops a fault tolerant structuring of AMAP as it
might be applied in an advanced application such as LHX.
Section 2 accordingly presents a top-down, baseline picture of
AMAP as it might appear and function in an advanced rotorcraft
system.
Section 3 explains the need for fault tolerant structuring of
AMAP and states reliability goals for system maintenance and flight
safety.
-5-
A tradeoff study based on candidate fault tolerant architectures
and the reliability goals of section 3 is presented in section 4.
This latter section also presents a candidate fault tolerant
structure for AMAP (as employed in the baseline system of Section
2).
Detailed hardware and software design considerations needed to
realize fault tolerant performance of this structure are discussed
in Section 5.
A conclusion is presented in the final section of the report.
Although this report develops a preliminary, fault tolerant
architecture for AMAP/SANDAC IV its principal purpose is to convey to
the digital avionics designer/analyst the perspectives, tools and
techniques leading not only to implementation of this architecture
but any of its future variants.
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2.0 AMAP IN THE ADVANCED ROTORCRAFT APPLICATION
2.1 Introduction
In this section, a baseline picture of AMAP, as embedded in an
advanced Army rotorcraft, is developed. It is important to note
that definition of digital hardware and software requirements
against 1990's operational needs is in an early formative stage.
The baseline rotorcraft system developed in this report is therefore
based on a projected synthesis of several known Army development
programs including AMAP. (These programs are discussed in more
detail in the next section.) As indicated in the introduction
(Section 1), a major objective of this report is not to reach a
final definition of the 1990's digital system but to provide the
avionics designer/analyst with some of the key perspectives and
tools needed to reach this ultimate goal.
2.2 Advanced Rotorcraft Digital System
2.2.1 AMAP in the Integrated Digital System
Figure 2-1 depicts AMAP as connected to the major digital
subsystems of the advanced rotorcraft. These subsystems include:
(1) Cockpit control/display system as currently being
investigated in AVRADA's ADAS program (reference 1)
(2) Conventional Navaid and communications suite.
(3) Voice interactive signal processor (an ADAS cockpit-control
extension)
(M) Integrated sensor and advanced communications suite
(as defined for LHX in references 2, 3 and 4.)
-7-
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(5) The Army's Advanced Digital Optical Control System (ADOCS)
as described in reference 5.
Functionally, cockpit elements and the AMAP processors constitute
the central manager of the o'verall digital system of Figure 2-1.
AMAP functions with regard to these subsystems (with the exception of
ADOCS) include:
(1) All cockpit, flight management and navigation functions of
the current (reference 1) ADAS processors.
(2) Management and support processing of the integrated sensor
suite including sensor analytical redundancy management.
ADOCS is a "fly-by-wire" system interconnecting cyclic, pedal
and collective cockpit controls to flight control actuators. ADOCS
processors additionally provide stability and handling-qualities
augmentation as well as limited maneuvering capability. Unlike AMAP,
ADOCS is a flight critical system (i.e. loss of ADOCS function will
most likely lead to loss of the aircraft.) In the analyses in this
report it is assumed that AMAP will interface with ADOCS by:
(1) Receiving (redundant) autopilot and air data sensor for use
in integrated sensor-fusion/analytical-redundancy
algorithms.
(2) Transmitting limited authority (outer loop) navigation
commands including:
(a) Preprogrammed bob-up trajectories,
(b) Memorized remask trajectories,
(c) Conventional IFR approaches and departures (category II
minimums.)
-9-
The foregoing AMAP functions are summarized in Table 2-1.
(It is noted that full authority navigation functions such as
automatic NOE flight are not considered in the analyses of this
report.)
-10-
TABLE 2-1
MAJOR AMAP FUNCTIONS
COCKPIT CONTROL/DISPLAY FUNCTIONS
NAVIGATION PROCESSING
SUPERVISE/MANAGE VHSIC PROCESSING RELATED TO:
- VOICE INTERACTIVE SUBSYSTEM
- TARGET ACQUISITION/IDENTIFICATION SUBSYSTEMS
- COMMUNICATIONS
PROCESSOR SYSTEM REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT
FLIGHT CONTROL
- PROVIDE fREDUNDANT) TRAJECTORY COMMANDS
- PROVIDE OUTER LOOP CONTROL COMMANDS ONLY
SENSOR/COMMUNICATIONS SUBSYSTEM REDUNDANCY
MANAGEMENT
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2.2.2 AMAP Components
In this report the 68000/SANDAC IV AMAP System projected for the
Army's System Test Bed for Avionics Research (STAR) testing is
considered. Here a simplex (i.e. non-redundant) system would contain
the modules shown in Table 2-2 in the indicated quantities.
(Note: Table 2-2 does not include numeric processor or VHSIC
based processor modules which would very likely be employed in the
advanced rotorcraft system. Exclusion of these modules affects
neither the validity of the analysis and design methods discussed
in this report nor the presented conclusions.)
-12-
TABLE 2-2
AMAP MODULES FOR STAR TESTS
MODULE TYPE QUANTITY
MASTER PROCESSOR 1
SLAVE PROCESSOR 3
1553B I/O SLAVES 3
GLOBAL MEMORY 1
STANDARD SERIAL/PARALLEL I/O 1
POWER SUPPLY 1
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3.0 AMAP FAULT TOLERANCE REQUIREMENTS AND RELIABILITY GOALS
3.1 Introduction - Basic Definition and Concepts
This report addresses the fact that all digital system components
are subject to physical failure. In analysing contemporary PC-card,
electrical-contact-oriented rotorcraft avionics systems using the
reliability analysis methods of MIL-HDBK-217, one finds that there are
three primary forms of physical failure:
(1) Electrical interconnect failures such as open connector/
switch contacts, PC trace opens/bridges, open/shorted solder
joints.
(2) Semiconductor device failures such as out-of-specification
parameter shifts, metalization defects, and wire bonds.
(3) Discrete component failures such as opens/shorts in filter/
decoupling capacitors.
Physical failures can lead to physical fault defined as an
unspecified and disruptive change in the logical function and/or of
a timing digital component, assembly, subsystem, etc. Digital
system faults may also arise from "man-made" faults in the form of
improper specificatons, software errors, inadequate electromagnetic
interference (EMI) protection, lack of understanding of thermal/
vibration environment, etc.
3.2 Fault Tolerant Digital Systems Design-overview
In the broadest sense, a fault tolerant digital system is a
system which can continue to function correctly after the occurrence
of (physical) faults and/or "man-made" faults. Its principal
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characteristic is that it will employ additional hardware and/or
software that would not be needed were the system free from faults.
One would naturally seek to avoid, or at least minimize, this
additional hardware and/or software overhead. Accordingly, the
digital system in its non-fault tolerant form is analysed to determine
the effects of faults on systems performance and reliability goals.
If these goals cannot be met, fault tolerant design is then pursued
by:
(1) Introducing hardware and/or software redundancy i.e.
developing fault tolerant architecture(s)
(2) Designing hardware circuits and/or software algorithms that
will make the architecture "work" i.e. developing
redundancy management methods
(3) Evaluating the results of (1) and (2) through analysis and
testing i.e. system verification and validation
As one might suspect this process is iterative, involving
consideration of candidate architectures followed by analysis,
consideration of modified architectures, further analysis, and so on.
Since the design activity is done against reliability goals, it
is helpful to briefly discuss not only reliability goals (i.e. for
AMAP) but reliability prediction models as applicable to fault
tolerant system's design.
-15-
3.3 Reliability Models and Goals
3.3.1 Reliability Models
Reliability is defined as the probability that an item (e.g.
component, subsystem, etc.) will perform satisfactorily for a
specified period of time under a stated set of use conditions. In
this report the single-parameter, exponential reliability model* is
employed where,
R(t) = e' Xt (2-1)
and
R(t) = probability that item will operate without failure for
time period, t (in hours)
e = base of natural logarithms
^ = item failure rate (in failures per hour), assumed to be
constant for a given set of stress, temperature and part
quality levels.
In this report, reliability calculations are based solely on
physical failures, i.e. x represents the physical failure rate of
the hardware item.
Two companion definitions will be employed:
(1) Mean time between failures (MTBF) defined as the reciprocal
of the item failure rate. I.e.,
MTBF (item) = 1/x (2-2)
* This is considered to be a reasonable model for electronic
components of the type employed in AMAP.
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(2) Unreliability U(t), the probability of occurrence of a
physical fault in an item. Here,
U(t) = 1-R(t) (23)
Note that the foregoing definitions apply to simplex (i.e. non-
redundant) items. (Reliability calculations for systems employing
redundant components are presented in Section M.)
3.3.2 Reliability Goals and Estimates
The preceding subsection addressed notions of item or component
reliability. This subsection discusses system reliability
requirements or goals with specific consideration of AMAP
reliability goals in the advanced rotorcraft application. In the
next section, estimates of system reliabilities of candidate AMAP
architectures will be calculated using component reliability data.
This estimate will, as a result, correspond only to physical faults.
I.e. it will not take into account "man-made" faults. In this sense,
system reliability estimates consitute an upper bound which would be
reached when all "man-made" faults are removed in system development.
Reliability goals represent the desired performance of the
fielded equipment. There are three reliability goals for the
advanced rotorcraft:
(1) Mission reliability
(2) Flight safety reliability
(3) Maintenance reliability
-17-
Mission reliability represents the probability that there will
not be a mission abort due to failure of "mission-critical"
components. Flight safety reliability corresponds to probability
that aircraft and/or crew will not be lost due to failure of "flight-
safety-critical" components. Maintenance reliability represents the
probability that system components will not have to be replaced.
Based on the LHX study (references 2 and 3) and the ADOCS report
of reference 5, the following reliability goals for AMAP are used in
this report:
-5
Mission: < 5 X 10 /hr (MTBF = 20000 hrs.)
-7
Flight Safety: < 10 /hr.
-3
Maintenance: < 1.5 X 10 /hr. (MTBF = 667 hrs.)
-18-
4.0 AMAP ARCHITECTURE TRADEOFF STUDY
4.1 Simplex System Reliability Analysis
The appendix presents a preliminary reliability analysis for a
simplex AMAP system employing the ten modules listed in Table 2-2.
The analysis results show that the simplex AMAP system reliability
-3
(approx. 10 /hr.) does not satisfy LHX-level mission reliability
-5
goals (5 X 10 /hr.) and that a fault-tolerant design will be needed
to meet the goals.
4.2 Redundant AMAP Architectures - Theoretical
AMAP is a multiple-module system. Although circuit design
techniques could conceivably be invoked to realize individual, fault
tolerant AMAP modules, it is far more practical to employ redundant
modules. (The reasoning behind this statement will be seen in the
subsequent discussion.)
In this subsection, a "first cut" is made to develop candidate
redundant structures for AMAP. As it turns out, redundancy can be
implemented in two ways:
(1) Dynamic Redundancy
A core of modules is supplemented with redundant hardware
such that in the event of a fault, "good" hardware will be
automatically substituted for the faulty hardware and correct
operation continued. A well known approach for doing this
involves use of stand-by-spare hardware (e.g. reference 2).
-19-
(2) Static Redundancy
Modules are simply replicated in duplex, triplex, quadruplex,
etc. form. In the event of a fault, the faulted module is
simply passivated and system operation taken up by the
remaining, good modules. Static redundancy is employed in
ADOCS (reference 5).
In this subsection, a system of n modules is considered
structured in three ways:
(1) As a simplex system (to be used as basis for comparison)
(2) As a dynamically redundant system employing a single spare
module.
(3) As statically redundant system in which all modules are
simply duplicated
(Redundancy beyond single-sparing (dynamic redundancy) and duplication
(static redundancy) are not considered since they represent "overkill"
for the AMAP application.)
Figures 4-1(a) through 4-1(c) depict the above three configur-
ations and also show equations for computing mission and maintenance
reliabilities. To compare these three it is assumed that ten modules
-4
are employed and that each has a reliability of 10 /hr. I.e.,
n = 10
-4
q = 10
o
Table 4-1 shows computed reliabilities for the three structures.
Also shown are relative packaging weights and volumes based on the
assumption that these parameters are directly proportional to module
count.
-20-
ARCHITECTURE: SIMPLEX
STRUCTURE:
APPROXIMATE RELIABILITY EQUATIONS:
MODULES
f -
'SYSTEM FAILURE PROBABILITY PER HOUR
MODULE FAILURE PROBABILITY PER HOUR
FIGURE M-1U)
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ARCHITECTURE: DYNAMIC REDUNDANCY - SINGLE SPARE
STRUCTURE:
APPROXIMATE RELIABILITY EQUATIONS;
MODULES * 1 SPARE
? SYSTEM FAILURE PROBABILITY ONE HOUR (MISSION)
'SYSTEM FAILURE PROBABILITY ONE HOUR (MAINTENANCE)
'MODULE FAILURE PROBABILITY PER HOUR
FIGURE M-
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ARCHITECTURE: STATIC REDUNDANCY - DUAL
STRUCTURE:
APPROXIMATE RELIABILITY EQUATIONS:
MODULES, DUPLICATED
fi± SYSTEM FAILURE PROBABILITY ONE HOUR (MISSION)
SYSTEM FAILURE PROBABILITY ONE HOUR (MAINTENANCE)
MODULE FAILURE PROBABILITY PER HOUR
FIGURE M-l(c)
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It is clear from the table that, at this level of analysis, the
dynamic redundancy based on a single spare will not only satisfy AMAP
mission and maintenance reliability goals but is far superior
strategy to static duplication.
Dynamic reduncancy however involves considerable hardware and
software overhead not required in the dual system. This is discussed
in the next subsection.
U.3 Dynamic Redundancy for AMAP/SANDAC IV
This subsection discusses some of the practical implications of
realizing standby redundancy for the SANDAC IV - based AMAP system.
4.3.1 Diversity of Module Types
The "first-cut" analysis in Section 4.2 carries the implicit
assumption that modules are identical - i.e. the "spare" can replace
any failed module. AMAP however consists of a family of modules,
e.g. 6 distinct types are employed in the 10 modules of Table 2-2.
In comparing AMAP module reliability estimates to the goals it is
clear that a "spare" would have to be carried for each module type
bringing the total count to 16 modules.
4.3.2 Register/Memory Reconfiguration
In reconfiguring a programmed - logic (e.g. microprocessor)
system one must not only replace hardware but the contents of a
failed unit's registers and data memory. Although a faulted module
may contain correct register and memory contents, faults within an
AMAP/SANDAC IV module will most likely block a spare module's
accessibility to this information. To effect fault recovery, the
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spare module will have to either:
(1) Reconstruct register/memory contents of the failed unit,
or
(2) Obtain "spare images" generated (by parallel computation)
either locally or from some other module.
Data reconstruction is impractical:
(a) Values for pure counters and integrators cannot be
reconstructed. These elements can however be expected to be
widely employed in the advanced rotorcraft software
algorithms.
(b) Processor reconfiguration times can introduce unacceptable
transport delays in the software algorithms resulting in
navigation/targeting errors and possible system instabilities.
Consequently some amount of spare parallel computation will be
required in the dynamic redundancy approach. This would have to be
done in the existing, or possibly additional, spares.
ij.3.3 Flight Safety Fault Tolerance
AMAP computations leading to (ADOCS) flight control commands must,
as a minimum, be duplicated in both hardware and software and results
of both trans-mitted to the flight control system. (This would
provide the flight control computers with a fail-detect-only
capability and the require-ment to autonomously effect fail-safe
recovery.) The duplicated computation would have to be done in the
existing, or possibly additional, spare(s).
M.3.1* Additional Hardware Overhead
-26-
M. 3.^.1 Bus Redundancy
SANDAC IV modules employ a simplex, parallel bus for inter-
module communications. Module faults, most notably in interconnects
and bus interface buffers, have a sizeable probability (Appendix A)
of "jamming" the bus and taking the entire system down. Remedies
for this would include both:
(a) Dual parallel bus.
(b) Isolation circuitry (e.g. dual buffers, analog switches, or
relay networks).
Figure 4-2 shows a possible dual-bus/dual-buffer solution in which
external signals (X and Y ) could be generated by a non-faulted
i i
module to isolate faulted module i.
It is estimated that implementation of such a solution would
entail a 20% to 30% increase in board area for each module. (It is
believed that an analog switch network would require substantially
more area; a relay network solution is not practical.)
4.3.^.2 Power Distribution Faults
In the SANDAC IV modules, the +5 VDC and + 15 VDC rails
constitute a single-point-of-failure in the sense that device
breakdowns, connection "opens", trace shorts, etc. in a given module
can propogate faults via the power bus into other good modules.
To protect the system from this probable type of fault,
protection circuitry (e.g. LC filters and regulators) would have to
be provided on each module for each supply voltage. (Estimated card
area penalty: 10% - 20$).
-27-
H.3.4.3 Power Supply Faults
Dual power supplies are required. Implementation of this
redundancy would very likely require additional load sensing and
transfer circuitry on each power supply module. (Estimated card
area penalty: 10$ - 20?.)
M.3.5 Additional Software Overhead
Although the focus of this section is on hardware redundancy, it
is well known that redundancy management software overhead for
dynamic, stand by systems can be very high. Static redundancy
management software typically commands some 10 - M0$ of system memory
and throughput resource. This figure can go to 70 - 90$ for dynamic
redundancy management. (The reasons for this will be seen in Section
4.4.) Additional software overhead translates to hardware overhead:
i.e. additional slave processor(s) and memory.
4.U Static Redundancy vs. Dynamic Redundancy for AMAP/SANDAC IV
4.4.1 Introduction
The foregoing paragraphs show that an implementation of AMAP
using dynamic redundancy will involve the additional
hardware overhead:
(1) Six spares would be required to cover the diversity of
module types.
(2) Module circuit complexity would have to be increased to
provide fault tolerance for parallel bussing and electrical
power distribution resulting in a 30$ to 50$ increase in
module volume.
(3) Some amount of hardware duplication would be required to
-28-
provide memory/register data "spares" and to meet flight
safety requirements.
(4) Additional computational resources would have to be provided
to support redundancy management software.
Under the assumption that items (3) and (4) could be accomodated
using the spare modules, items (1) and (2) would represent the
minimum hardware overhead needed to realize standby redundancy.
-29-
Table 4-2 shows characteristics for theoretical standby-
redundancy, AMAP/SANDAC IV standby-redundancy and dual redundancy,
Figures for the AMAP/SANDAC IV system are minimums. There figures
show that in terms of hardware requirements, the static and dynamic
architectures are roughly equivalent: both have comparable
maintenance reliability; both satisfy mission reliability
requirements.
4.4.2 Static vs. Dynamic Redundancy Management Requirements
Discussion to this point has been principally concerned with
establishing survivability through modular hardware redundancy.
Redundancy however must be "managed": if a module fails, the
surviving modules must be able to detect the failure, isolate it and
effect recovery. It has already been indicated (Section 4.3.5) that
the hardware and software* overhead requirements for dynamic
redundancy can significantly exceed those for static redundancy and
in fact constitute the major function of the overall hardware/
software system. This appears to be the case for AMAP/SANDAC IV.
When employed in the dynamic, single-standby-redundancy structure, a
faulted AMAP module can successfully transmit "bad" data and
addresses to non-faulted modules contaminating (or "faulting") the
latter. Unless corrected, this kind of propagated faults can lead to
system failure. The root of this problem is the fact that the 68000
microprocessor architecture has a very limited amount of register/
memory error detection correction coding. To insure system
survivability against fault propogation:
* These two elements can be traded off one for the other.
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(1) A majority of "good" processors would have to monitor and
validate each bus transaction. For example, a slave attem-
pting to write global memory would first have to have the
transaction validated by another slave and the master before
the write could be effected.
(2) Each module's continous built-in-test would have to be very
extensive. For example, RAM checksums would have to be
computed for each memory access.
These expedients cut very deeply into overall system throughput
capability. For the 68000 architecture (and for that matter any
conventional fixed-instruction-set microprocessor) certain areas
remain uncovered such as:
(1) Undetected PROM faults generating invalid op-codes
(2) The "unintelligent" modules such as the 1553B and general
purpose I/O modules.
The above problems do not arise in the dual architecture since
module failures within one module set do not affect the function of
the other module set. (This statement must be somewhat qualified
since dual modules will communicate with each other. As will be seen
in the next section, fault propogation protection is easily handled
with minimal demands on system throughput.)
4.5 Architecture Tradeoff Study - Conclusion
For AMAP/SANDAC IV employing the ten modules shown in Table 2-2:
(1) Static redundancy would appear to be superior to dynamic
-32-
redundancy in terms of hardware requirements.
(2) Redundancy management demands on system throughput would be
significantly less for the statically redundant, dual
architecture.
The dual architecture accordingly appears to be the "best"
approach for meeting advanced rotorcraft mission, maintenance and
flight-safety reliability goals.
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5.0 HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR AMAP/SANDAC IV
DUAL ARCHITECTURE
5.1 Introduction
The foregoing section developed AMAP module set duplication as a
candidate redundant architecture for the advanced rotorcraft.
There are two remaining steps to complete the design process:
1) Definition of redundancy management hardware and software
methods that will implement the fault tolerant design.
2) Verification and Validation steps to insure that the design
meets both functional and fault tolerance requirements.
These two steps are the subject of this section.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that redundancy
management methods are invoked as a defense against physical faults
only. Although redundancy management methods can to an extent handle
certain types of man-made faults, the latter are all hopefully found
in the final verification and validation steps.
5.2 Redundancy Management-System Level
In section 4, the dual AMAP architecture was developed against
what was essentially a simplex advanced rotorcraft system (Figure 2-1.)
In this subsection, the structure and function of this system
architecture is redefined in a manner that will satisfy both
processor reliability goals and system reliability goals.
-34-
5.2.1 System Redundant Architecture
Figure 5-1 depicts the dual processor embedded in the advanced
rotorcraft digital system. This proposed structure is similar to
that of ADAS and features:
1) The dual AMAP module sets or channels.
2) Dual redundancy in cockpit control/display subsystems.
(Cockpit functions are assumed to be mission-critical. It is
further assumed that the overall cockpit system must be fail-
operate to satisfy system reliability goals. Note that this
does not necessarily imply that cockpit hardware must be
duplicated "across the board")
3) Dual 1553B connections to the simplex sensor suite.
4) Dual 1553B connections to the flight control subsystem.
5) Cross-strapped 1553B connections to dual radio communications.
6) Inclusion of redundancy management functions in the cockpit
control display subsystem cross-strapped with AMAP. (This
is discussed further in Section 5.2.2.2)
In this Structure:
1) Both processors compute in parallel.
2) For sensor system processing, one processor's 1553B interface
to the sensor and communications subsystems is active
(receive and transmit); the other processor's 1553B interface
to the sensor and communications subsystems is in standby
(receive only.)
3) Both processors' 1553B interfaces to the cockpit and flight
control subsystems are active (transmit and receive.)
-35-
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(Note: This system configuration, as defined, is based on
the assumption that sensor and communications subsystems will
employ conventional dual-1553B ports in active/standby mode.
Dual active connections to cockpit are recommended; dual
active connections to the flight control subsystem are
mandatory where AMAP signals can effect flight safety.)
5.2.2 System Redundancy Management Design Considerations
5.2.2.1 Authority Hierarchy
Redundancy management involves not only fault detection and
isolation but action to deselect, reconfigure and/or switch
resources. Owing to the complexity of digital systems, one can not
exclude the possibility of faults which result in fault-handling
contentions between crew and the system or between elements within
the system. For example, one cannot exclude the possibility of
certain fault classes wherein pilot and computer (or one computer and
another) "disagree" on the nature or location of faults and engage in
a "fight" to assert control. For this reason, the system must be
designed so that system elements have relative levels of authority, a
higher authority element always having the capability of overriding
element(s) of lower authority.
For the redundant avionics system, we would have, starting with
the highest authority:
1) Crew decision/action.
2) Cockpit redundancy management subsystem (see below).
3) Dual AMAP channels.
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4) Balance of digital system (sensor subsystems and
communications subsystem.)
This hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 5-2.
Note that the flight control subsystem (ADOCS) is excluded in
this list since its redundancy management considerations are
completely independent of those of the avionics system.
5.2.2.2 Cockpit Redundancy Management Subsystem
Since ultimate authority for digital system management resides in
the cockpit, panel avionics are required to display system fault
status and permit the crew to alter (e.g. deselect, reconfigure,
switch, etc.) resources at will.
This system is presently undefined but is seen to have the
following requirements:
1) It must be fault tolerant not only within its own structuring
but be capable of surviving all possible faults that can be
generated by the subsystems it controls.
2) As will be seen, it will have to have some degree of
(automatic) decision-making capability to support redundancy
management of the dual AMAP system.
5.2.3 System Fault Handling
Following the authority hierarchy described in Section 5.2.2.1:
1) AMAP would utilize sensor subsystem BITE status, 1553B
protocol (e.g. parity) and analytical redundancy (reference 2)
to automatically detect failures in the sensor subsystems and
deselect sensor(s) accordingly.
-38-
CREW DECISION/
ACTION
COCKPIT
CONTROL/DISPLAY
AVIONICS
DUAL AMAP
AVIONICS
BALANCE OF SYSTEM
(EXCLUDING ADOCS)
FIGURE 5-2 FAULT TOLERANCE AUTHORITY HIERARCHY
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2) In the event of processor and/or 1553B channel failure, AMAP
processors and the sensors would be manually or automatically
switched to the standby processor and standby 1553B channels.
Before discussing the mechanics of effecting this switch (Section
5.*O it will be useful to examine, in more detail, the nature and
effects of (physical) faults and how they are dealt with within the
AMAP processor hardware.
5.3 Redundancy Management Techniques - AMAP/Sandac IV
Given that we have a dual active/standby structure for AMAP, our
design objective is to develop methods to defect faults when they
occur in the active channel and to effect the manual or automatic
switch to the standby channel. An objective of this subsection
therefore is to provide the avionics designer with both the general
philosophy behind redundancy management and a "shopping list" of
known redundancy management techniques.
5.3.1 General Considerations
5.3.1.1 Fault Mechanisms and Failure Effects
Although possible semiconductor and connector failure mechanisms
are small in number, the number of possible failure states in a
microprocessor system are virtually infinite. One cannot therefore
pursue design of fault detection methods by enumerating all possible
failure states.
We therefore take a more "macroscopic" view by noting that faults
in a microprocessor system will in most cases result in three
outcomes:
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1) Incorrect sequential logic. (The most likely outcome here
will be a system halt or "crash".)
2) Incorrect data values originating from faults in read/write
store (assuming that memory has no parity protection) and I/O,
3) Incorrect frame rate resulting from oscillator/counter
drifts/faults.
5.3.1.2 Fault Detection Strategy
Given a system of redundant channels, there are two basic
strategies for detecting a faulted channel:
a) Each channel can perform self-diagnostics. When a fault is
encountered, the channel declares itself "failed".
b) Channels can perform cross-diagnostics, "good" channel(s)
detecting and identifying the "bad" channel(s) or at least
the existence of disagreements.
The first of these strategies is preferred for two reasons:
The first is philosophical: under the self-diagnosis strategy a
channel falsely declaring itself failed is indeed failed; under the
cross-diagnosis strategy, a "bad" channel can declare a "good"
channel failed thereby setting up a total system failure.
The second reason is practical: Self-diagnostics are easy to
implement; cross channel diagnostics are much more difficult.
Emphasis in the following is therefore placed on self-diagnostic
techniques.
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5.3.1.3 Hardware vs. Software Redundancy Management Implementation
Redundancy management can be effected using hardware (parity
checkers, comparators, "watchdog" timers, etc.) and/or software
techniques. Since AMAP/SANDAC IV hardware is assumed to be a
"given", emphasis in the following is on software techniques. (Some
additional hardware requirements are however indicated; these are
pointed out in the discussion).
5.3.2 Built-in-Test (BIT)
Processor and processor system built-in self-tests are performed
to not only detect in-flight processor faults but to: (a) assist in
maintenance, (b) provide preflight tests to assure that the
processor system is correct. (Recall that mission reliability
predictions are made under the premise that the system is fault-free
when committed to mission operation.)
One can therefore identify three levels of BIT:
a) Maintenance Built-in-Test (MBIT.)
Comprehensive test designed chiefly against field maintaina-
bility requirements.
b) Preflight Built-in-Test (PBIT.)
Subset of MBIT functions designed to provide fast, preflight
check of system integrity.
c) Continuous Built-in-Test (CBIT)
Subset of MBIT and/or PBIT functions. Run in real time (each
frame or in background across several frames) for purpose of
detecting in-flight faults which do not affect program flow.
Typical BIT funcitons are shown in Table 5-1.
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TABLE 5-1
TYPICAL MICROPROCESSOR BUILT-IN-TEST ELEMENTS
CPU TESTS
- INSTRUCTION SET TESTS
- ALU LOGICAL FUNCTIONS
- ALU ARITHMETIC FUNCTIONS
- REGISTER TESTS
ADDRESSABLE I/O AND INTERPROCESSOR COMMUNICATIONS
- MONITOR VALIDITY OF PREPROGRAMMED TRAFFIC
- TOKEN PASSING WITH DATA TRANSFERS
NUMERIC PROCESSOR
- ARITHMETIC CHECKS
- FUNCTION COMPUTATION CHECKS
MEMORY
- PROM/EPROM CHECKSUMS
- RAM PARITY
- FULL ADDRESS/CONTENT TESTS (PREFLIGHT)
TIMING
- WATCHDOG TIMERS
- INTRAPROCESSOR TIMING CHECKS
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For AMAP, both master and slave processors would execute local
BIT routines.
5.3.3 Deadline Mechanisms
As indicated earlier, microprocessor faults have a high
likihood of disrupting intended sequential logic flow with the result
that the system logic goes into a halted, fixed state.
Deadline mechanisms are a simple, effective means to detect this
condition. The most widely-used mechanism of this sort is the so-
called "watchdog timer". Here, an independent digital or analog
timer is employed. In normal operation, the processor periodically
(e.g. at the end of each computation frame) resets the timer. In the
event of a fault-caused processor halt, the reset signal is not
generated causing the timer to "time out" and flag the halt-state
event. (The "watchdog" will also detect some oscillator failures.)
The "watchdog" principle can often be implemented without adding
timer hardware. For example, the master and slave processors in an
AMAP channel can each simply count frames and exchange frame counts.
These multiple processors can accordingly "watch" one another and
signal a fault condition when a frame count mismatch is encountered.
The reader can probably envision other (hopefully better) ways to
apply this principle within the existing AMAP structure. (Additional
"watchdog" hardware may be required for AMAP to cover the possibility
of an entire processor channel entering a halt state.)
5.3.^ Software Assertions
Read/write (i.e. RAM) memory failures can result in incorrect
data variables. (It is assumed that there is no RAM parity
-44-
checking.) Software assertions simply consist of code inserted in
the application program which test the "reasonableness" of input data
and computational results. Input or data memory failures resulting
in unreasonable data values or data value changes in time can be
flagged with these assertions. Assertion code blocks can be
incorporated as a part of CBIT.
5.3.5 Built-in Redundancy Management
AMAP/Sandac IV hardware has several inherent features which can
and should be employed to support fault detection including:
a) 1553B parity checks
b) Parallel bus protocols
c) Processor exception handlers
5.3.6 Predictive Task Scheduling
In designing combined sequential and parallel software tasks, one
has two basic options:
a) Static (Predictive) Tasking. Task sequences are preplanned.
A specific task sequence is executed only on the basis of
polled input discretes (e.g. pilot mode selects).
b) Dynamic (Adaptive) Tasking. A task sequence is not known
i
apriori, but occurs on the basis of interrupts and/or values
of the input data.
In theory, dynamic tasking is superior in the sense that the
"user" is serviced promptly and "dead time" tasks are avoided. In an
avionics system however this superiority is not practically realized
since:
-45-
a) Data changes and event response requirements are slow with
respect to the system sampling (or frame) rate.
b) Task sequencing requirements are made not in the interest of
rapid task execution but in getting the worst case task
sequence done within the sampling period.
Static tasking on the other hand has a large potential benefit in
detecting those sequential logic faults and timing faults that do not
result in a processor halt. Since each possible task sequence is
known in advance, processors withing the system can be programmed to
verify that the correct sequence is indeed being executed. (Such
programming could employ a combination of token - passing between
processors and subframe counters.)
5.3.7 Wraparound Tests
Wraparound tests are designed to detect faults in processor I/O
hardware. (In all of the foregoing redundancy management methods,
software is employed to enable the CPU to check itself, memory,
interprocessor communication integrity and timing. Input structure
integrity testing is limited to parity checks and assertion testing;
output integrity however cannot be determined via the CPU.) To
effect wraparound testing one simply connects processor (parallel,
serial, and 1553) outputs to corresponding inputs and executes I/O
tests to verify that input and output hardware are functioning
correctly.
The concept is illustrated in Figure 5-3. Hardware overhead is
required to effect the wraparound test, specifically the (analog)
switch network to effect the input-output connection.
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5.3.8 Cross-Channel Testing
Redundancy management techniques presented to this point have
focused on the preferred approach of having individual AMAP channels
detect and announce their own faults.
Faults can also be detected externally:
a) Standby channel for example can monitor 1553B transmissions
of the active channel and compare the latter's transmitted
data values to its corresponding computed values. (Active
channel transmissions to flight control subsystem would not
be monitored since standby channel will also be transmitting
to that subsystem.) If miscompares are encountered, the
standby channel can signal the cockpit that a fault condition
has been detected.
b) FJLight control subsystem can likewise signal a fault
condition on miscompare. (In this event, the flight control
subsystem would have to revert to fail-safe mode of
operation.)
c) Connected sensor and communications subsystems can, through
parity checks and local data assertions, identify some (but
not all) incorrect outputs from the active channel.
d) Cockpit Control/Display Avionics can likewise effect
comparisons of processor outputs provided that the former have
access to 1553B outputs.
To implement comparison monitoring, one must be concerned with
synchronization (or lack thereof) of the dual AMAP channels. Pros
and cons of synchronous and asynchronous strategies are summarized in
Table 5-2.
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Table 5-2 Synchronous vs. Asynchronous Redundant
Digital Flight System
SYNCHRONOUS ASYNCHRONOUS
ADVANTAGES
Cross-channel data
differences provide
positive fault
indication in output
voting plane.
Can use metastable
algorithms (i.e. pure
counters and integra-
tors) in closed-loop
operation
Hardware channels
independent
Synchronization logic
constitutes system
single-point-of-
failure
DISADVANTAGES
Requires time-refer-
encing for certain
variables
Subject to nuisance
trips in output
voting planes
Requires asymp-
totically stable
algorithms in closed
loop application
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5.H Fault-Handling - AMAP/Sandac IV
5.4.1 Dual Processor Fault Detection and Isolation
In the event of a fault in an active channel, three events must
transpire:
a) The fault must be detected,
b) The fault must be isolated to the active channel,
c) The "switch" must be made from the active to the standby
channel. (I.e. the system must be reconfigured.)
Standby channel faults would be flagged for maintenance;
flight would continue on the active channel with no backup.
As discussed earlier, dual processors can detect faults through:
a) Self-tests (These are summarized for the readers convenience
in Table 5-3)
b) Cross-channel comparison of 1553B outputs.
As also discussed, identity of a faulted channel is more or less
"guaranteed" through self tests whereas comparison monitoring can
"guarantee" only fault existence.
Following the authority hierarchy discussed in Section 5.2.2.1,
channel switch would be effected manually or automatically in the
cockpit. To support implementation of this "switch", dual processor
channels would have to provide status signals to the cockpit. These
status signals are summarized in Figure 5-4.
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TABLE 5-3
SUMMARY OF SELF-TEST METHODS
BUILT-IN-TESTS (TABLE 5-1)
DEADLINE MECHANISMS
- WATCHDOG TIMERS
- TASK SCHEDULE MONITORING
ASSERTIONS
- REASONABLENESS CHECKS ON COMPUTED DATA VALUES
- ANALYTICAL REDUNDANCY
BUILT-IN REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
- 1553B PARITY
- PARALLEL BUS PROTOCOL
- EXCEPTION/TRAP HANDLERS
PREDICTIVE SEQUENTIAL LOGIC FLOW
- MULTIPLE PROCESSOR CHECKS ON REQUIRED TASK FLOW
WRAPAROUNDS
- COCKPIT CHECKLIST FUNCTIONS FOR MAINTENANCE AND
PREFLIGHT BUILTHN-TEST
- DEDICATED HARDWARE TO TO EFFECT I/O CLOSURE
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5.H.2 Cockpit Fault Monitoring and Reconfiguration Logic Requirement
Management of the dual processor redundancy, most particularly
the switch of channels, would be effected with the cockpit control
display avionics. At the present time, this system and its functions
are undefined. This subsection therefore deals only with the
embedded requirements of the cockpit avionics to effect fault
detection, fault isolation and the switch to the standby unit.
Such requirements would be refined (and quite possibly changed) as a
part of the cockpit system detailed design.
Cockpit/AMAP redundancy management interface is summarized in
Figure 5-5. Features of this interface include:
1) Circuit breaker disconnects to each channel.
2) Pilot can select:
(a) Either processor channel in automatic mode enabling
automatic channel switch, or,
(b) Either processor in non-automatic mode (channel not
switched)
3) Automatic mode would effect automatic switch to standby
channel under the sole conditions of:
(a) Standby channel self-test indicating no faults, and,
(b) Active channel self-test indicating fault.
Cross channel miscompares would only be announced; action
would be left to pilot decision.
In implementing the foregoing cockpit functions one will probably
have to address the question: "Which channel should be selected as
the active channel?" In theory, it does not matter since the
-53-
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preflight built-in-test (PBIT) is designed to assure that both
channels are perfect when flight operations commerce. From a
practical standpoint however, one cannot design a "perfect" PBIT.
For example, a standby channel may have a weak parallel output port
connection which looks "good" on ground PBIT but suffers from
intermittent "opens" from flight vibration. If the port is in
standby, this fault will show up only after a switch from the active
channels is made. These kinds of faults (frequently referred to as
latent faults) tend to accumulate in non-exercised, standby systems.
An effective means of purging these kinds of faults is to
periodically alternate active/standby roles of the two channels.
Scheduling of active/standby roles could be incorporated in AMAP's
built in maintenance - testing/logging system, designated roles being
furnished automatically or as a crew checklist advisory.
5.5 Verification and Validation of Digital System Fault Tolerance
5.5.1 General Considerations
In the design, development and fielding of the fault tolerant
digital system one seeks to satisfy not only system functional
requirements but continued, correct system operation under all
probable fault conditions.
The following paragraphs discuss some of the major techniques
that have been employed in the past to address digital system fault
tolerance. (No one has yet found a way to prove fault tolerance
under all probable fault conditions.) These techniques are employed
as a part of the engineering activity generally referred to as sytem
verification and validation. Several definitions exist for these
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terms. For the purposes of this report we will use the following
definitions:
(Fault Tolerance) Verification - Process of establishing that the
AMAP/SANDAC IV - based rotorcraft system design will continue to
function correctly under all probable fault conditions.
(Fault Tolerance) Validation - Process of testing in the real
environment or an environment nearly as real as possible that the
system does continue to function under all probable fault conditions.
Verification activities are principally "paper" oriented,
consisting of on-going design analyses begun at the early,
preliminary design phase and continuing through completion of
detailed, documented system design. A major emphasis in verification
is to continually insure that (written) system specifications are
being satisfied during the development process.
Validation activities on the other hand are concerned with the
actual performance of the complete, piloted system in a full-up
simulation or flight environment. Validation activities seek not
only to verify specification correctness but the fact that actual
system requirements are actually being satisfied.
Given these definitions, verification and validation activities
as applicable to AMAP/SANDAC IV fault tolerance are discussed
seperately as follows.
5.5.2 Verification Design Analyses of Fault Tolerant Systems
As indicated earlier in this report, a fault tolerant system
definition evolves through an iterative sequence of candidate design
-56-
definition followed by design analysis.
The following briefly describe four principal analysis approaches
that are frequently employed in fault tolerant system design
analysis.
5.5.2.1 Reliability Analysis
Preliminary reliability analyses for AMAP/SANDAC IV were
presented in the beginning part of this report (Sections 3 and 4).
Such analyses provide "order-of-magnitude" accuracy and are intended
to guide overall evaluation of architectural candidates.
As more detailed system definition evolves, one turns to more
accurate, formal reliability prediction methods including:
(a) MIL-HDBK-217D, a piece-part reliability prediction tool.
(Single channel reliability estimates; maintenance
reliability estimates.)
(b) MIL-STD-756B, derives reliability equations for redundant
system configurations.
(c) Reliability estimating computer programs such as the CARE
III reliability modelling and analysis program recently
released by NASA Langley.
5.5.2.2 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
FMEA constitues a "bottom-up" approach for evaluating fault
tolerant systems. Here, one identifies the probable failure modes
that can occur at the component, module, and/or system level. For
each identified failure mode, the system is then analysed to
determine its fault response.
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Probabilities are often associated with each failure mode so that
a net probability can be assigned to the aggregate failure effects of
all failure modes.
5.5.2.3 Fault Tree Analysis
Fault tree analysis "reverses" the FMEA and begins with a "top-
level" event such as "total system failure." Given the "top-level"
event, one then seeks to define all of the "second-level" events
which can give rise to the former. Each "second level" event is then
broken down into "third level" events, and so on. This process
results in a tree structure, the lowest-levels of the tree
constituting system component failures.
5.5.2.4 Single-Point-of-Failure Analysis
Redundant system realizations frequently contain single elements
which when failed can lead to total system failure.
The "man-made" faults discussed in Section 3-1 can constitute
single-pointS'Of-failure. Redundant systems may moreover depend upon
elements such as non-fault synchronization logic or simplex monitors
whose physical faults can lead to system failure.
In effecting a single-point-of-failure analysis, one seeks
through scrutiny of system documentation to identify all of the
possible single-points-of-failure and to estimate the probability of
occurance of each. The analysis can lead to one of two actions:
(a) Retaining the element(s) constituting single-points-of-
failure where it is clearly demonstrated that system
reliability requirements are not compromised, or
(b) Redesign including possible additional redundancy.
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Common single-points-of-failure are summarized in Table 5-4.
5.5.2.5 Analysis Limitations
All of the foregoing analysis approaches are in reality ad hoc
engineering approaches: reliability estimates are as good as the
user's reliability model; correspondingly, there are no guaranteed
ways of enumerating all failure modes, to generate complete fault
trees or to identify all possible single-points-of-failure.
The analysis techniques do however collectively constitute
somewhat independent, systematic frameworks with which the
designer/analyst can eliminate design deficiencies that would
otherwise produce serious setbacks during validation testing or lead
to costly retrofitting in the field.
5.5.2.6 Verification Documentation
Fault tolerance analysis methods and results are invariably
documented for the purposes of:
(a) Obtaining airworthiness approval.
(b) Guiding development of the validation test plan.
5.5.3 Fault Tolerance Validation Testing
5.5.3.1 General Considerations
Although design analyses are important ingredients in ultimately
realizing viable complex digital flight systems, there is probably no
better development tool to demonstrate design integrity (or to expose
design weakness) than testing.
The AMAP/SANDAC IV development will undoubtedly go through
several levels of testing:
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Table 5-4 TYPICAL SINGLE-POINTS-OF-FAILURE
SINGLE-POINT-OF-FAILURE
SOFTWARE
POTENTIAL SOLUTION
System reset with
transfer to primitive
and provable code.
TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION
- Classical Recovery Block
- REBUS
NASA Ames Dryden 1978-1984
EMI
(all channels)
Manual/watchdog
reset. Automatic
recovery with meas-
ured/zero aircraft
state estimate.
- Classical Retry
- Microprocessor Experiments
NASA Ames 1978-1982
SYNCRONIZATION
LOGIC
Parallel asynchronous
operation with static/
stable algorithms.
RAMPS NASA Ames 1979-1982
Shuttle Computers Synchronized
AFTI/F-16 Total Failure
GENERIC COMPONENT
DEFECTS
100% Screen/Testing
Select common com-
ponnents from dissem-
ilar lots/processes
- Shuttle experienced failures
- Shuttle flys generic
hardware.
VLSI DESIGN/TOOLING
SOFTWARE
Self test/finite
state test
VLSI on Boeing 757/767
Fly-by-wire Engine Control.
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1) Module tests.
2) Individual channel bench tests (single AMAP LRU tested
against simulated inputs and outputs.)
3) Bench tests with the redundant configuration.
4) Ground simulations with pilot-in-loop (as presently being
done with ADAS).
5) Flight testing.
To test system fault tolerance one must, quite obviously, have
faults as input stimuli. Although components can be expected to fail
during development testing, such faults can be expected to comprise
only an infinitesmal fraciton of all probable faults. It is
therefore necessary to inject simulated faults during those tests
performed as a part of system functional validation.
Two basic approaches for injecting faults are hardware fault
insertion and software fault simulation. These are discussed in the
following paragraphs. Before discussing these methods it is noted
that fault injection exercises constitute part of a (written) overall
system test plan. One must accordingly develop a fault injection
*
test plan which hopefully will cover all the probable faults that can
occur during system operation. Results of fault tree and failure-
modes-and-effects analyses provide key inputs to this test plan.
w
One cannot, of course, test against all faults. For this reason,
the verification analyses are frequently considered as additional
bases for system validation.
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5.5.3.2 Hardware Fault Insertion
With the prospect that several thousand faults may be injected
during validation testing, one has the design challenge of
introducing valid faults but doing so in a manner that will not
damage system components. For example, short circuit faults to
ground of high-current-carrying conductors are hard to simulate
without producing over-voltage stresses on semiconductor junctions.
Other types of hardware faults can however be safely and
*
realistically simulated. For example:
a) Connector open-contact-faults can be simulated using a
relay or analog switch test rig temporarily placed between
plug-connector interfaces within the system.
b) Semiconductor pin-level faults consisting of "stuck-at" and
"open" logic levels have been simulated using the test setup
illustrated in Figure 5-6. (Reference 6).
A well planned fault insertion setup will have the fault
insertion hardware under (minicomputer) software control permitting
input of a large number of fault patterns and automatic logging of
fault response.
5.5.3.3 Resident Fault Simulation
Although the hardware fault insertion approach can provide
realistic fault stimuli it has two major disadvantages;
a) Considerable effort must go into design and development of
insertion hardware.
*
USC understands that this is currently being done with ADAS at AVRADA
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FIGURE 5-6U) FAULT INSERTION SETUP FOR SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES
-63-
DEVICE
FET
IMPLANT
13h
•
1
1
1
1
DIRECT
t rvM™r?r*TTr>M
CONTROL
t 5IGNMj ••'rt/f W»M RnrrtET
SOCKET
FIGURE 5-6(8) DETAIL OF INJECTION CIRCUIT
BETWEEN DEVICE AND SOCKET
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b) Test set-up time can be prohibitive. (Insertion hardware
would cover only a limited number of electrical contacts and
chips. This hardware would have to be relocated several
hundred times during validation.)
Many hardware faults can be simulated by colocating a fault
simulation program with the applications programs in the master and
slave processors. Upon external signal (provided through spare
discrete inputs) this program could for example:
a) Execute a halt thereby simulating the effects of many
sequential logic faults.
b) Fault memory locations. (EPROM would have to" be temporarily
relocated to RAM.)
c) Simulate faults in analog and discrete I/O.
5.5.M Elimination of Man-Made Faults
Unlike physical faults, man-made faults (Section 3) can be
eliminated through hardware and/or software re-design. Experience
with fault tolerant digital flight control systems has shown that
thorough ground integration and validation testing and flight
testing* can expose in excess of 95% of man-made faults. By
tracking design errors during testing one can obtain the (typical)
history shown in Figure 5-7).
•For a system of the scale of AMAP/SANDAC IV/STAR: approximately
2000 hrs ground test} 50 hrs flight test.
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6.0 Conclusions
As stated at the outset, the principal objective of this report
has been to provide the avionics designer with some of the
perspectives, tools and techniques needed to realize the fault
tolerant AMAP system in the advanced rotorcraft application.
Selection of static, dual redundancy for AMAP/SANDAC IV is based
on information currently at hand. This choice however should be
continuously re-examined as future AMAP and advanced rotorcraft
system definition evolve from the AMAP/SANDAC IV development
experience.
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APPENDIX
PRELIMINARY RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF AMAP/SANDAC IV. PROCESSOR
Given a completed, detailed digital system design (including
parts lists and component quality grades) one can formally employ the
method of MIL-HDBK-217D to obtain a reliability prediction of the
fielded system.
Where fine design detail is unavailable (e.g. in preliminary
architectures tradeoff studies) digital system reliability must be
estimated using nominal failure rate values for the system
components. In the past, USC has used the following failure rates
for estimating reliability of microprocessor-based digital flight
systems:
Component
LSI Semiconductor chip
Single connector contact
Crystal
Power Supply Reg./Cap.
Discrete Logic, PC Boards
Solder joints and feedthroughs
Failure Rate (per hour)
-6
10
-6
10
-6
10
-5
10
negligible
For the simplex (i.e. non-redundant) system, overall system
failure rate is simply the sum of the failure rates of the individual
components. For each AMAP/SANDAC IV module we would have roughly;
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Item Failure rate (per hour)
-5
(10) LSI components 10
(100) Contacts 10
Balance negligible
Total (per hour) 1.1 x 10
From ten AMAP modules (Table 2-2 in main body of report) one
-3
would therefore have a failure rate of roughly 10 /hr.
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